Tuesday, August 2, 2011

The Importance of Human Intelligence


          History is bound to repeat itself if we as a nation do not make adjustments in regards to national defense. As we draw near the ten year anniversary of the terrorist attacks that took place in the US on September 11, 2001 it is necessary to take a look at the importance of human intelligence (HUMINT). One of the major contributing factors to the attacks that took place was the downsizing in HUMINT during the Clinton administration. It is imperative to note what the importance of HUMINT is over other forms of intelligence gathering, what changes have been made since 9/11 within the intelligence community in regards to HUMINT, and why HUMINT is so effective. Human intelligence is the most important and cost effective intelligence gathering asset that the US has available to combat terrorist activity.
            It is imperative to take a look at the importance of HUMINT over other forms of intelligence gathering within the intelligence community. According to Richelson “a number of observers and commissions have suggested that both the attacks of 9/11 and the intelligence failure with regard to Iraqi WMD’s are, to a significant degree, attributable to a lack of human intelligence”.[1] It can be said that during the Clinton administration the defense budget and more specifically the HUMINT budget was cut drastically. During this time period funding also transitioned to other forms of intelligence gathering assets such as imagery and signals intelligence. During the years of 1996 to 2000 military intelligence gathering assets performed roles originally designed for the CIA, DIA, and other similar collection agencies. During this time period military intelligence gathering assets were tasked with missions of gathering information about weapons of mass destruction being shipped out of Iraq and into neighboring countries, which was completely confusing do to the fact that when the time came to look for WMDs within Iraq after 2001 there was previous knowledge that they were not there anymore. While providing this information the operators tasked with gathering this information utilized assets such as satellite imagery and thermal energy detection devices also known as MASINT, however none of this information would have been complete without a person on the ground able to see with human eyes what was impossible for satellites to see. Utilizing these other forms of intelligence gathering was useful to the operators on the ground and helped conduct intelligence gathering missions. What is interesting to note is the fact that the cost of a satellite, moving a satellite in orbit to gain view of the area of operation, and the quality of information provided by said satellite are all costly and not of high quality as compared to an operator on the ground with surveillance equipment readily available to use.
            Post September 11th, 2001 a commission was formed to detail the history of terrorist threats to the US, the events that took place on September 11th, as well as recommendations from a bi-partisan government run commission. The commission’s recommendations were based upon an analysis of the intelligence community and the discrepancies that existed at the time. Again stemming from the cutbacks during the Clinton administration the intelligence community witnessed competition between intelligence gathering agencies such as the CIA, NSA, DIA, and FBI for funding which resulted in a failure to share intelligence between associated agencies. The competition for funding created a group of agencies with a piece of the information pie each. These agencies together had a complete picture of threats to the US but separately did not have enough information to act upon such threats. In hindsight as the commission states “one missing element was effective management of transnational operations. Action officers should have drawn on all available knowledge in the government (agencies). This management should have ensured that information was shared and duties were clearly assigned across agencies and across the foreign-domestic divide”.[2] In today’s intelligence community there are liaisons that operate between respective intelligence gathering agencies that ensure information is disseminated properly to prevent such a situation from happening again.
            The effectiveness of HUMINT can be found in the teachings of Sun Tzu. The notorious tactician states “knowledge of the enemy’s dispositions can only be obtained from other men”.[3]  Granted, Sun Tzu did not have such things as unmanned drones or satellites at his disposal but recognized the importance of covert and clandestine individuals behind and within enemy lines acting as a commander’s eyes and ears of the battlefield. An individual that has been involved in information/intelligence gathering understands the meaning and importance of the term “eyes and ears of the battlefield”. As an example of the effectiveness of HUMINT one source states that the intelligence community has prevented attacks on US embassies as well as international targets due to informants or foreign assets working with the US.[4] In fact since 9/11 attacks have been thwarted in Canada, the US, England, Indonesia, and a list of other countries due to the changes the intelligence community has made in regards to HUMINT. Even international intelligence agencies have fallen in line with what the 9/11 commission had suggested in regards to HUMINT and information sharing.
            Again, it is imperative to understand that if the intelligence community did not make the necessary changes post 9/11 then history is bound to repeat itself. Since 9/11 many potential attacks have been quelled internationally due to these changes. The commission, as well as other nation/states’ intelligence assets have placed an increased importance on human intelligence operations recognizing the importance of having eyes and ears on the battlefield. The effectiveness of human intelligence assets has also been recognized and appropriate changes have been made to increase the effectiveness of human intelligence assets. This can be seen in the decrease of terrorist activity especially within the United States. Budget cutbacks and competition for funding has been replaced with increased funding and liaison personnel that coordinates information sharing between human intelligence units throughout the world. In the future terrorist organizations, as decentralized units, will strive to find weaknesses within the intelligence community and intelligence gathering assets must remain flexible and communicative with other agencies in order to ensure a much safer international community. With the advancement and utilization of future technologies it will be equally important to utilize supporting elements such as satellite imagery, thermal imagery, and covert or clandestine foreign assets. These assets must not be used primarily, rather as a supplement to human intelligence operators throughout the world in order to prevent attacks such as those previously on US embassies and in New York on September 11th, 2001. Cooperation between foreign entities will also be vital to the success of international intelligence gathering units.


[1] Jeffrey T. Richelson , The US Intelligence Community, 5th ed. (Colorado: Westview Press, 2008), 529.
[2] The 9/11 Commission Report: Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, (New York: Norton, 2004), 353.
[3] Sun Tzu, The Art of War, translated by Lionel Giles, edited by Dallas Gavin, (New York: Barnes and Noble, 2004), 59.
[4] Chris Dishman, "Looking to future, CIA should focus on human intelligence." Christian Science Monitor, August 06, 1997. International Security & Counter Terrorism Reference Center, EBSCOhost (accessed July 28, 2011)

Wednesday, May 25, 2011

The American Dream By The Provocateur Network

Recommended viewing for every American. This is the foundation of the impending American revolution or dissolution....



Tuesday, May 24, 2011

Intelligence Community Issues

As we near a decade since the attacks on September 11th it is important for the Intelligence Community to take a look back and reassess. Three issues that I see as continuous problems that confront the US Intelligence Community are the depleted human intelligence assets, officials and organizations within the intelligence community not being held accountable for failures, and a need for change as noted in the 9/11 Commission Report. Taking note of the “2025 Global Trends Final Report” we can see how the US Intelligence Community will be effected if these issues are not addressed. It is imperative that the IC continue to adapt and display its usefulness, as well as cost effectiveness. According to SunTzu “raising a host of a hundred thousand men and marching them great distances entails heavy loss on the people and a drain on the resources of the State”, in regards to how cost effective it is to employ human intelligence agents versus deploying troops.[1]
               
      Depleted human intelligence assets (HUMINT) are something I am familiar with. During the Clinton administration funding for HUMINT assets was cut back to the point that military Special Forces and intelligence units played a major part in gathering information and acting as HUMINT assets. As noted in the US Intelligence Community “a number of observers and commissions have suggested that both the attacks of 9/11 and the intelligence failure with regard to Iraqi WMDs are, to a significant degree, attributable to a lack of human intelligence” as evidence of the issue of depleted HUMINT.[2] Continuing to utilize HUMINT whether international, host nation, or homegrown to conduct and analyze intelligence and counterintelligence operations is a must. These human assets fill the gaps that other intelligence methods such as COMINT and SIGINT cannot fill, and answers the questions that items such as satellite imagery cannot answer.

                Responsibility for failure is a reoccurring issue in the IC, however restructuring and removal from office has taken place after past failures within the IC. Richelson points out “the danger of ignoring the key role that individuals play in organizational success or failure can have unfortunate consequences. Individuals not held responsible for significant failures may repeat them. The message conveyed by allowing those failures to go unpunished is that there is no penalty for failure, and that such individuals will not be replaced by people of greater competence, courage, and integrity”, in regards to how responsibility for failure is a major issue with in the IC.[3]

                Post 9/11 attacks, a need for change within the IC became apparent. Too many government organizations competing for tight funding of operations and analysis within the IC ensured the entire picture of what was going to happen on September 11, 2001 was missed. Information sharing between agencies was not utilized and as a result the 9/11 Commission promoted the idea of liaisons between agencies tasked with intelligence gathering and processing in regards to the US’s threats. Restructuring and retooling was needed in order to try to prevent attacks such as these from happening again. As noted in the 9/11 Commission Report “the need to restructure the intelligence community grows out of six problems that have become apparent before and after 9/11: structural barriers to performing joint intelligence work,…lack of common standards and practices across the foreign-domestic divide,…divided management of national intelligence capabilities,…weak capacity to set priorities and move resources,…too many jobs (or tasks asked of the former DCI),…too complex and secret”.[4]

                When referencing the Global Trends 2025: A Transformed World report you will find four possible global scenarios: “A World Without the West, October Surprise, BRICs’ Bust Up, and Politics is Not Always Local”.[5] There are a few underlying themes in this report and these scenarios that should concern the intelligence community. Future possible conflicts over a shortening supply of natural resources due to over population are the issues that reign across each of these scenarios. In order to combat these issues the IC will need to be utilized for clandestine monitoring of compliance with use and distribution of shortening supplies of natural resources as well as waste management and environmental impact due to over population. The US does not need to lean towards a “New World Order” as some conspiracy theorists suggest, the US IC can help maintain the stability of the position of the US as a super power independent from a global or collective effort to stabilize the global economy, international relations, and natural resource management. 

                As we, as a nation, draw closer to the anniversary of the 9/11 attacks we should put some faith in the intelligence community’s ability to adapt to the times and our government to provide sufficient oversight and transparency. We will also need our IC and government leaders to recognize that there is a depleted HUMINT supply, they need to be held responsible and hold themselves responsible for failures, and both groups must recognize the need for change and restructuring. 



[1] SunTzu, The Art of War, ed. Dallas Galvin, trans. Lionel Giles, (New York: Barnes and Noble, 2003), 199.
[2] Jeffrey T. Richelson, The US Intelligence Community, 5th ed. (Westview: 2008), 529.
[3] Ibid. 529
[4] The 9/11 Commission Report: Final Report of the National Commission on the Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, (Norton), 408.
[5] Global Trends Final Report 2025 http://www.dni.gov/nic/PDF_2025/2025_Global_Trends_Final_Report.pdf (accessed 05/23/11)

California’s Budget Crisis: A Step Away From the Past and a Move Towards the Future

The issue that Californians feel is most important is the issue of the budget. The state currently runs a deficit of close to 30 billion dollars. The current Governor feels that an approach of raising taxes, focusing on education, and utilizing government subsidies are the answer to the budget crisis. If I were to propose budget adjustments to Governor Brown I would first draft my proposed solutions and post them on a website to gain public interest. Once public interest is gained public support and financial support would be necessary to promote the proposed solutions. Once interest, support and proper advertising is achieved the proposed adjustments can be presented in an attempt to influence policy makers.

A look in to the previous budget problems of California and the solutions that were implemented is important to look at in order to formulate proper solutions to combat the current crisis. California in the past has raised taxes and increased tax percentages on items such as vehicle registration in order to generate income for the budget. These solutions may have temporarily solved a much greater problem but have continued to not generate a balanced budget on a consistent basis. Governor Brown in his revised state budget states “based on a rebounding economy and higher state tax revenue, the revised budget calls for general fund spending to rise above its previous proposal for the 2011-12 fiscal year, from $84.6 billion in January to $88.8 billion today. The revised number still represents a $2.8 billion reduction from the 2010-11 general fund budget. Total state spending, which includes federal money and revenue dedicated to specific programs, would rise to $132.5 billion, about $5 billion higher than in the current fiscal year”, in regards to what the state faces currently.(1) His solution includes raising taxes, allocating tax revenue for education, subsidizing health and human services, and cutting the state work force.

Proposed Solutions:
Eliminating tax shelters is a step in generating more tax revenue. According to one accounting website “the Franchise Tax Board estimates that California lost as much as $2 billion in tax revenue over the last four years due to abusive tax schemes, which generally have no business purpose except to hide income and reduce taxes”, which is 2 billion dollars that could go towards state jobs instead of cutting the state workforce.(2) Governor Brown proposes to cut the state workforce by at least 5500 employees. This cut of employees means 5500 new unemployed drawing unemployment benefits from the state instead of putting more tax dollars back into the economy. California specifically has also noticed a rise in businesses leaving the state because of high taxes as compared to states like Nevada where small business taxes are waived.

Utilizing government subsidies to become the leader in alternative energy product development, distribution, and exportation would pay off in the long run for the state as a product such as this could be sold internationally. Reports show that with the increase in global population the globes natural resources will be strained creating conflict. If one of those resources sought after by the world is a cost effective alternative energy resource then related businesses in California would thrive as natural resource exploitation has done for the Middle East region. This research and development would also create jobs which in turn would generate more tax revenue not only from the workforce but from sales of the alternative energy product. Costco currently sells individual solar cells with battery packs as an idea of what I am explaining here.


History has shown that strong economies have started out with a vast agriculture infrastructure. California, with its prime soil and weather for growing, should be the world leader in agriculture as a form of self-sustenance, to export to other states, and export internationally. A recent report states “in 2008, the value of California agriculture exports reached an all-time high of $12.9 billion, a 16 percent increase from 2007”.(3) This is a positive index to California’s ability to bring in revenue by providing an export.

I strongly believe that in times of financial crisis the federal government should intervene and allow for a certain percentage rebate on federal taxes collected from the state that can go back to the state as a stimulus package. If Californians were able to pay a smaller percentage in taxes to the federal government and that small percentage were to go back to the state then the state would not have to cut jobs, funding for social services, or raise taxes.

A controversial proposal that could be considered would be an effort to spur the California tourism industry. I feel that if developers were allowed to build coastal casino resort communities in California with the intent of incorporating a heavy tax on the industry in the state then that money could go to subsidize education in the state in much of the same way the California Lottery is supposed to. This proposal would also provide jobs, local industry would thrive, and California would become even more of a travel vacation destination.

The budget crisis of California can be fixed but our leaders must take a look at how past economic and financial budget plans have or have not worked. If our leaders continue to try solutions that haven’t worked in the past then the state will continue to have the same results. California can pull out of the current budget crisis with a combination of Governor Brown’s proposal as well as: growth in California’s agriculture industry, becoming a leader in alternative energy export, instituting a federal tax break for states in financial crisis, the elimination of tax shelters, and a spur in the California tourism industry. These proposals show a removal from past failed solutions and a move towards increased jobs, increased state tax revenue, and increased funding for education, as well as a balanced budget.

(1) “California Governor’s Revisited State Budget at a Glance”, The Associated Press, (May 17, 2011) http://www.businessweek.com/ap/financialnews/D9N96G800.htm (accessed 05/23/11)

(2) William A Mathews, Georgi Gabrielyan and Daniel A. Sumner, “California International Agriculture Exports in 2008”, AIC Issues Brief, (March, 2010) http://aic.ucdavis.edu/pub/briefs/brief36.pdf (accessed 05/23/11)

(3) http://aic.ucdavis.edu/pub/briefs/brief36.pdf

Wednesday, May 4, 2011

Bug Out Bag Basics | The Inner Circle

Bug Out Bag Basics

Author: Aaron Frankel

About: Aaron Frankel is the editor of In The Rabbit Hole Urban Survival Blog and Co-Host of In The Rabbit Hole Urban Survival Podcast.

Perusing the online forums, you are likely to see a swath of images containing Bug Out Bags, or BOBs for short, that look like the owner is ready to go to war. You may be asking yourself, “Do I really need all this?” Yes and No – keep reading and I’ll explain.

A bug out bag can be any kind of bag containing the minimum items you need to leave your home and seek safety somewhere else, in the event of a disaster. The length of time a BOB should be able to sustain you is a subject for debate, but the most common practice is 72 hours.

Basic Items Needed:
3 Days Of Food
Water Bottle
Water Purification Tablets
Compact Shelter (Tents down to tarps. Whatever you are comfortable with)
3 Disposable Lighters (also a useful prop when using the Disposable Lighter Repairman routine in disaster shelters.)
$20 or more in cash
Toiletries
Tooth Brush
Tooth Paste
Deodorant
Soap
Talcum Powder
Feminine Hygiene products, a.k.a Tampons
Full change of clothes that are seasonally appropriate
Work Gloves
Flash Light
Headlamp
Extra Cell Phone charging cable and adapters to plug into a wall or car.
First Aid Kit
Multi-tool
Pen and a Sharpie
Small Note Pad
Duct Tape
Small Stuffed Animal
Condoms

And of course don’t forget your copy of Emergency, for survival tips and an entertaining way to pass the time when you’re not using the condoms.

Food is the trickiest item on the list because of its limited options. You want something edible, but also that can store for an extended period of time. Canned goods are not the greatest, but do offer on option. The contents are typically ready to eat, but if they do need to be cooked, they can be cooked right in the can with a small fire. While they do add weight from the water content, the water counts toward your intake needs. MREs (Meals Ready To Eat) are tried, true, and traditionally the most popular. They last for years and have become a lot more palatable recently. Freeze Dried foods, such as those from Mountain House, are also a good option. They have a long shelf life, are lightweight, and easy to prepare. C-rations are very light weight, very compact, and calorie dense. Buy some of each and see what you think before going bananas. Each person is different and tastes vary.

Some of the items I am suggesting may seem odd. I assure you, they all have a purpose. I’ll explain below.

Work gloves serve double duty. They can keep your hands warm, and they can protect your hands. In a disaster, whether personal or otherwise, handling debris or other potentially dangerous items can injure your hands. Hands are rather important.

Why a headlamp and a flashlight? Flashlights have their place. They can be used as a weapon, they can be used to signal, and they are typically brighter than headlamps. Headlamps allow you to keep light on something and both hands free to do tasks.

Extra cell phone charging cable and adapters are important because if you are grabbing your bag in a hurry or under stress you quite possibly may forget such an item. Cell phones have become an indispensable tool of communication, both in calling for help and making sure loved ones are safe.

Feminine Hygiene products are useful in a number of ways, in addition to their intended purpose. They can make a very good bandage for wounds and burns, they can be used as a wick in a make-shift oil lamp and they are also excellent for cleaning firearms. Keep an eye out for a later article on uses of Tampons in survival.

Talcum powder is not something I have ever seen listed. However, on many a camping trip, I have found it to be extremely useful. First, it helps you feel a little more fresh in situations where bathing is not an option. Second, if you are having to do a lot of walking, chaffing can easily become a real irritant. Several manufacturers make travel size bottles. As a Marine Corp buddy of mine once said after a long tour in Iraq, “Dog gone Monkey butt ain’t no laughing matter. I would have given darn near anything for a bottle of Gold Bond.”

Seasonally appropriate clothing is an important bullet point. Your ability to weather the elements will play a key role in your comfort level and survival. Be sure you are equipped appropriately.

In the event you have to use your bag, writing information down and leaving notes could become crucial. There is also an added benefit. On the outside cover I write, “1st RESPONDER: Emergency #s and Info Inside”. On the inside of the cover I put: Health Insurance, Primary Physician, Medical Alerts, and Driver’s License Number. On the first page I keep a list of my most important contact telephone numbers. After family, I include the highest-ranking friend from each named and unnamed law enforcement agency I know. This all works best using a waterproof marker, like a Sharpie, and a “Rite in the Rain” all-weather notebook No135.

A small stuffed animal may seem like a very strange item for a BOB. It was to me when I first heard the suggestion. However, if you have a child and they lose their favorite buddy, it could be a good backup. If you do not have a child you may just make a truly crappy situation bearable for a child you come across. If things are really bad, you may need it yourself.
There are many other survival tips I will go into at a later date, where condoms are useful. In addition to those, grabbing the birth control is easy to forget when dashing for the door. Hurricane Babes is a term often used in my neck of the woods. In disasters and times of “hunkering down”, people get bored.

Is This A Complete Bug Out Bag List?

No, this is a basic list. As the title indicated, this is BOB basics. Bug Out Bag contents are regularly debated online and off, passionately. What goes in a Bug Out Bag beyond the basics, is highly personal. I have met people that keep Kiehl’s facial moisturizer (ok that one’s mine), Game Boys, M&Ms, darn near a full tool box, gas masks, you name it in their BOBs. Put whatever you think will help YOU survive physically and mentally, into the bag. You just have to be willing to hump all that junk some day – hump as in carry, not as in using the condoms on your bag, pervert.

Yes and No

First of all, “need” is a subjective word. It makes me bananas when people throw around the word “need” like a three year old. If you decide you have a goal that can not be accomplished without something, then yes, you need it. I will stop my rant there.
Yes, in my opinion, everyone should have a BOB. They provide the most efficient, least hassle way to quickly get out of harm’s way, with all or most of the things to make the ordeal as painless as possible. This can be life saving. This can also mean you beat the herd on the evacuation route and forgo spending hours on end sitting in traffic only to run out of gas and be stuck, still in the disaster’s range.

No, it does not have to be – and probably shouldn’t be – the tacticoolest on the block. No, you will most likely never need to go flying out of the house at full speed with bag in tow, but if you needed to, you could.

Final Words

It is a good practice to go through your bag every three to six months. There are a few reasons for this.

BOBs need a balance between essential items, and weight. It is an unlikely scenario, but you could find yourself having to carry this bag over long distances on foot. The last think you want is to be dragging a lot of weight needlessly. Go through your bag, take everything out, and ask yourself what you really need and don’t. As your survival skills and knowledge progress you will find that you need less gear.

I live in a region of the country that really only has two seasons: hot and humid as hell, and kinda cold. This means twice a year I add to or deduct from the contents of my bag, and my girlfriend’s bag. Others may find that they need to cycle the contents of their bag more frequently, and have vastly different climatic issues to consider.

There are food stores, such as Mainstay Emergency Food Rations and MREs, that are compact and can be left in a bag for a very very long time. Most people will feel the need for a little more variety in their diet. Expiration dates should still be checked regardless, and packaging should be inspected for damage.

Condoms expire. Seriously.

I keep a box of my discarded BOB items. Reasons range from no longer needed to found something better. When making new bags I often pull from this box to build out a new kind of bag, rather than going out and buying more crap. My first dedicated car bag was built this way.
Know every piece of gear in your bag intimately – don’t confuse this with the use of condoms, intimately. Understand how they work before you need them. Just reading instructions isn’t enough. Actually, try everything out before putting it in your bag.

Thursday, April 14, 2011

Shotgun Ammunition: 'Rounds of Authority'


Great little video about the different types of shotgun ammo available and their effects.

Wednesday, April 13, 2011

Mujahedeen: Deception and its Impact

                It is evident that starting in 1979 and continuing through today the Mujahedeen have used deception to overcome and impact the US ability to make decisions based on ground truth. There was a large level of impact on the US Intelligence Community and the US Government. The success of this impact is measured by the level of mirror imaging that took place and the failure to realize the local views towards foreign control.
               
                Deception played a big part of the progression of the Mujahedeen. Through their US backed conflict with the former Soviet Union backed Peoples Republic of Afghanistan, the Mujahedeen readily accepted money, training, and resources that were crucial in their fight against the Russians. All while accepting this support the Mujahedeen had planned on turning on the US as noticed in the YouTube video Secrets of the CIA (new) - Part 4/6 by Mel Goodman and other high level analysts.[1] It is also evident that not only deception but self-deception was utilized by the Mujahedeen. In regards to self-deception, in Silent Warfare: Understanding the World of Intelligence the authors explain that “the false view of the situation one wishes an adversary to adopt must be determined by the action one wishes the adversary to take”.[2]



                

               The level of impact on the US was large. After the US left Afghanistan for the most part post Russian withdrawal, it can be argued that a large part of the Mujahedeen branched out to other organizations such as Al Qaida, the Taliban, and operated as Iraq war insurgents from Al Qaida spinoffs. As seen in our other YouTube supplemental video Secrets of the CIA (new) - Part 5/6, another analyst compares how the US assets devoted to analyzing intelligence about Al Qaida (and the Mujahedeen) started out with just a handful of analysts and is now large in scope and size of assets.[3] Another issue of concern regarding impact is the issue of blowback. Andy McNabb is an example of blowback stemming from the training of the Mujahedeen and Northern Alliance soldiers and how it has negatively affected the US and its interests. Again in the YouTube video Secrets of the CIA (new) - Part 4/6 you can see McNabb, a former British SAS operator, explains how he taught these soldiers how to make explosives, shoot down helicopters, and how to utilize improvised explosive devices or IEDs which were so effective in Iraq and still are today in Afghanistan against US and coalition forces.[4] This makes me wonder what our government would do to me if I started training Americans how to do all of that. 


               

               Mirror imaging, according to Shulsky and Schmitt, is defined as “the judging of unfamiliar situations on the basis of familiar ones”.[5] Mirror imaging on the part of US intelligence analysts and policy makers was a form of failure in regards to assessments about the Mujahedeen. The “we wouldn’t do that if we were them” attitude did not pan out in this instance. Also, the Afghan people’s views towards foreign control or presence were not taken into consideration resulting in blowback. A 2009 article in Survival details the “US and British failures to understand the extent of resistance in Afghanistan to anything that feels like foreign control, the 1979-89 war between the Soviet-backed Afghanistan government and its mujahedeen adversaries, and the power of non-state groups to rely on uses of force not controlled by any state” proving the importance of mirror imaging when it comes to intelligence assessment.[6]

 
                We can see that through deception the Mujahedeen and similar entities have exposed the US intelligence community of its failures. Mirror imaging was a catalyst to these types of organizations and their ability to affect the US. Blowback and a step up in resources devoted to the situation have brought to light the impact that the Mujahedeen and similar organizations have the US, the intelligence community, and its assets.  





[1] Secrets of the CIA (new) - Part 4/6
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Oh6UI5i0yCI&feature=related (9:00-9:40, 10:25-10:34 accessed 04/13/11)
[2] Abram N. Shulsky and Gary J. Schmitt, Silent Warfare: Understanding the World of Intelligence 3rd ed. (Potomac, 2002), 121.
[3] Secrets of the CIA (new) - Part 5/6 http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wo9hslrF8b8&feature=related (10:15-10:30 accessed 04/13/11)
[4] Secrets of the CIA (new) - Part 4/6 http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Oh6UI5i0yCI&feature=related (7:45-8:06 accessed 04/13/11)
[5] Abram N. Shulsky and Gary J. Schmitt, Silent Warfare: Understanding the World of Intelligence 3rd ed. (Potomac, 2002), 67.
[6] Adam Roberts, “Doctrine and Reality in Afghanistan”, Survival, 51 (Feb/Mar, 2009) 1, abstract. http://web.ebscohost.com.ezproxy2.apus.edu/ehost/detail?vid=6&hid=119&sid=9b827dfb-d4ac-4510-9932-93840a98fda7%40sessionmgr112&bdata=JnNpdGU9ZWhvc3QtbGl2ZQ%3d%3d#db=tsh&AN=36449345

Sunday, April 10, 2011

Failures in the Intelligence Community


Causes of Failure within the Intelligence Community
            In chapter 3 of our text we find the major causes of intelligence failure listed as subordination of intelligence policy, unavailability of information when and where needed, received opinion, and mirror imaging. Of these four causes of failure, even though all are important, I believe received opinion is the most important area in regards to intelligence failure.
            Looking at subordination of intelligence to policy you will find that this type of failure is caused by an analysis leaning towards what an individual analyst believes his/her superiors would want to hear. As noted in Silent Warfare Understanding the World of Intelligence subordination of intelligence to policy “is perhaps the most commonly discussed source of error or bias in intelligence analysis”.[1] This form of failure may be the most commonly discussed but I feel it is not the most important to address of all the types of intelligence failures. Historical examples of this may include analysts trying to appease leaders from authoritative dictatorships such as Hitler’s Germany and Saddam Hussein’s Iraq.
            Unavailability of information is the most interesting problem to me in regards to intelligence. According to Shulsky and Schmitt “this unavailability has various causes: for example, security regulations…,bureaucratic jealousness and power struggles, or simple lack of awareness in the office processing the data of another office’s information needs”.[2] Our text points out the attack on Pearl Harbor by the Japanese as an example of unavailability of information when and where needed. I also feel that the attacks on US soil on September 11th 2001 show this country’s weakness when it comes to this sort of information sharing. The 9/11 Commission Report was drafted as a result of the breakdown of information sharing that allowed the attacks to happen and included recommendations on what steps to take to prevent that breakdown from possibly happening again.
            The most important cause of failure within the intelligence community in my opinion is received opinion, or “those opinions about a subject that are generally regarded without sufficient investigation, as true” according to Shulsky and Schmitt.[3] Our text uses the Iraq invasion of Kuwait as an example citing analysts whose opinions were that Iraq would not invade Kuwait despite imagery that showed troop build ups along the border of the two countries. In the supplemental reading for this week, the ICD 203 Analytic Standards document, details how to generate assumption (which is part of the process of analysis) without letting “conventional wisdom” create negative results. The document states “analytic products should identify indicators that would signal whether assumptions or judgments are more or less likely to be correct” as an answer to the possible problem of received opinion.[4]
            Mirror imaging is the last of our four causes of failure.  In my opinion this is the least important of the four and deals with the assumptions made on unfamiliar situations based on familiar situations. Basically the assumption is made based on what the entity making the assumption would do if they were in a similar situation. Our text cites the Yom Kippur War in 1973 in which “Israel’s intelligence services did not imagine that the Arabs would begin a war that they seemed sure to lose”.[5] 
            After researching the subject of causes of failure within the intelligence we find four major causes. These causes include subordination of intelligence to policy, unavailability of information when and where needed, received opinion, and mirror imaging. Although all of these factors are important, I feel that received opinion is the most mitigated by intelligence community standards and mirror imaging is the least mitigated.


[1] Abram N. Shulsky and Gary J. Schmitt, Silent Warfare Understanding the World of Intelligence (Potomac, 2002), 64.
[2] Abram N. Shulsky and Gary J. Schmitt, Silent Warfare Understanding the World of Intelligence (Potomac, 2002), 65.
[3] Abram N. Shulsky and Gary J. Schmitt, Silent Warfare Understanding the World of Intelligence (Potomac, 2002), 65.
[4] Intelligence Community Directive Number 203 (June, 2007) http://www.dni.gov/electronic_reading_room/ICD_203.pdf
[5] Abram N. Shulsky and Gary J. Schmitt, Silent Warfare Understanding the World of Intelligence (Potomac, 2002), 67.