It is evident that starting in 1979 and continuing through today the Mujahedeen have used deception to overcome and impact the US ability to make decisions based on ground truth. There was a large level of impact on the US Intelligence Community and the US Government. The success of this impact is measured by the level of mirror imaging that took place and the failure to realize the local views towards foreign control.
Deception played a big part of the progression of the Mujahedeen. Through their US backed conflict with the former Soviet Union backed Peoples Republic of Afghanistan, the Mujahedeen readily accepted money, training, and resources that were crucial in their fight against the Russians. All while accepting this support the Mujahedeen had planned on turning on the US as noticed in the YouTube video Secrets of the CIA (new) - Part 4/6 by Mel Goodman and other high level analysts.[1] It is also evident that not only deception but self-deception was utilized by the Mujahedeen. In regards to self-deception, in Silent Warfare: Understanding the World of Intelligence the authors explain that “the false view of the situation one wishes an adversary to adopt must be determined by the action one wishes the adversary to take”.[2]
The level of impact on the US was large. After the US left Afghanistan for the most part post Russian withdrawal, it can be argued that a large part of the Mujahedeen branched out to other organizations such as Al Qaida, the Taliban, and operated as Iraq war insurgents from Al Qaida spinoffs. As seen in our other YouTube supplemental video Secrets of the CIA (new) - Part 5/6, another analyst compares how the US assets devoted to analyzing intelligence about Al Qaida (and the Mujahedeen) started out with just a handful of analysts and is now large in scope and size of assets.[3] Another issue of concern regarding impact is the issue of blowback. Andy McNabb is an example of blowback stemming from the training of the Mujahedeen and Northern Alliance soldiers and how it has negatively affected the US and its interests. Again in the YouTube video Secrets of the CIA (new) - Part 4/6 you can see McNabb, a former British SAS operator, explains how he taught these soldiers how to make explosives, shoot down helicopters, and how to utilize improvised explosive devices or IEDs which were so effective in Iraq and still are today in Afghanistan against US and coalition forces.[4] This makes me wonder what our government would do to me if I started training Americans how to do all of that.
Mirror imaging, according to Shulsky and Schmitt, is defined as “the judging of unfamiliar situations on the basis of familiar ones”.[5] Mirror imaging on the part of US intelligence analysts and policy makers was a form of failure in regards to assessments about the Mujahedeen. The “we wouldn’t do that if we were them” attitude did not pan out in this instance. Also, the Afghan people’s views towards foreign control or presence were not taken into consideration resulting in blowback. A 2009 article in Survival details the “US and British failures to understand the extent of resistance in Afghanistan to anything that feels like foreign control, the 1979-89 war between the Soviet-backed Afghanistan government and its mujahedeen adversaries, and the power of non-state groups to rely on uses of force not controlled by any state” proving the importance of mirror imaging when it comes to intelligence assessment.[6]
We can see that through deception the Mujahedeen and similar entities have exposed the US intelligence community of its failures. Mirror imaging was a catalyst to these types of organizations and their ability to affect the US. Blowback and a step up in resources devoted to the situation have brought to light the impact that the Mujahedeen and similar organizations have the US, the intelligence community, and its assets.
[1] Secrets of the CIA (new) - Part 4/6
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Oh6UI5i0yCI&feature=related (9:00-9:40, 10:25-10:34 accessed 04/13/11)
[2] Abram N. Shulsky and Gary J. Schmitt, Silent Warfare: Understanding the World of Intelligence 3rd ed. (Potomac, 2002), 121.
[3] Secrets of the CIA (new) - Part 5/6 http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wo9hslrF8b8&feature=related (10:15-10:30 accessed 04/13/11)
[4] Secrets of the CIA (new) - Part 4/6 http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Oh6UI5i0yCI&feature=related (7:45-8:06 accessed 04/13/11)
[5] Abram N. Shulsky and Gary J. Schmitt, Silent Warfare: Understanding the World of Intelligence 3rd ed. (Potomac, 2002), 67.
[6] Adam Roberts, “Doctrine and Reality in Afghanistan”, Survival, 51 (Feb/Mar, 2009) 1, abstract. http://web.ebscohost.com.ezproxy2.apus.edu/ehost/detail?vid=6&hid=119&sid=9b827dfb-d4ac-4510-9932-93840a98fda7%40sessionmgr112&bdata=JnNpdGU9ZWhvc3QtbGl2ZQ%3d%3d#db=tsh&AN=36449345
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