Tuesday, August 2, 2011

The Importance of Human Intelligence


          History is bound to repeat itself if we as a nation do not make adjustments in regards to national defense. As we draw near the ten year anniversary of the terrorist attacks that took place in the US on September 11, 2001 it is necessary to take a look at the importance of human intelligence (HUMINT). One of the major contributing factors to the attacks that took place was the downsizing in HUMINT during the Clinton administration. It is imperative to note what the importance of HUMINT is over other forms of intelligence gathering, what changes have been made since 9/11 within the intelligence community in regards to HUMINT, and why HUMINT is so effective. Human intelligence is the most important and cost effective intelligence gathering asset that the US has available to combat terrorist activity.
            It is imperative to take a look at the importance of HUMINT over other forms of intelligence gathering within the intelligence community. According to Richelson “a number of observers and commissions have suggested that both the attacks of 9/11 and the intelligence failure with regard to Iraqi WMD’s are, to a significant degree, attributable to a lack of human intelligence”.[1] It can be said that during the Clinton administration the defense budget and more specifically the HUMINT budget was cut drastically. During this time period funding also transitioned to other forms of intelligence gathering assets such as imagery and signals intelligence. During the years of 1996 to 2000 military intelligence gathering assets performed roles originally designed for the CIA, DIA, and other similar collection agencies. During this time period military intelligence gathering assets were tasked with missions of gathering information about weapons of mass destruction being shipped out of Iraq and into neighboring countries, which was completely confusing do to the fact that when the time came to look for WMDs within Iraq after 2001 there was previous knowledge that they were not there anymore. While providing this information the operators tasked with gathering this information utilized assets such as satellite imagery and thermal energy detection devices also known as MASINT, however none of this information would have been complete without a person on the ground able to see with human eyes what was impossible for satellites to see. Utilizing these other forms of intelligence gathering was useful to the operators on the ground and helped conduct intelligence gathering missions. What is interesting to note is the fact that the cost of a satellite, moving a satellite in orbit to gain view of the area of operation, and the quality of information provided by said satellite are all costly and not of high quality as compared to an operator on the ground with surveillance equipment readily available to use.
            Post September 11th, 2001 a commission was formed to detail the history of terrorist threats to the US, the events that took place on September 11th, as well as recommendations from a bi-partisan government run commission. The commission’s recommendations were based upon an analysis of the intelligence community and the discrepancies that existed at the time. Again stemming from the cutbacks during the Clinton administration the intelligence community witnessed competition between intelligence gathering agencies such as the CIA, NSA, DIA, and FBI for funding which resulted in a failure to share intelligence between associated agencies. The competition for funding created a group of agencies with a piece of the information pie each. These agencies together had a complete picture of threats to the US but separately did not have enough information to act upon such threats. In hindsight as the commission states “one missing element was effective management of transnational operations. Action officers should have drawn on all available knowledge in the government (agencies). This management should have ensured that information was shared and duties were clearly assigned across agencies and across the foreign-domestic divide”.[2] In today’s intelligence community there are liaisons that operate between respective intelligence gathering agencies that ensure information is disseminated properly to prevent such a situation from happening again.
            The effectiveness of HUMINT can be found in the teachings of Sun Tzu. The notorious tactician states “knowledge of the enemy’s dispositions can only be obtained from other men”.[3]  Granted, Sun Tzu did not have such things as unmanned drones or satellites at his disposal but recognized the importance of covert and clandestine individuals behind and within enemy lines acting as a commander’s eyes and ears of the battlefield. An individual that has been involved in information/intelligence gathering understands the meaning and importance of the term “eyes and ears of the battlefield”. As an example of the effectiveness of HUMINT one source states that the intelligence community has prevented attacks on US embassies as well as international targets due to informants or foreign assets working with the US.[4] In fact since 9/11 attacks have been thwarted in Canada, the US, England, Indonesia, and a list of other countries due to the changes the intelligence community has made in regards to HUMINT. Even international intelligence agencies have fallen in line with what the 9/11 commission had suggested in regards to HUMINT and information sharing.
            Again, it is imperative to understand that if the intelligence community did not make the necessary changes post 9/11 then history is bound to repeat itself. Since 9/11 many potential attacks have been quelled internationally due to these changes. The commission, as well as other nation/states’ intelligence assets have placed an increased importance on human intelligence operations recognizing the importance of having eyes and ears on the battlefield. The effectiveness of human intelligence assets has also been recognized and appropriate changes have been made to increase the effectiveness of human intelligence assets. This can be seen in the decrease of terrorist activity especially within the United States. Budget cutbacks and competition for funding has been replaced with increased funding and liaison personnel that coordinates information sharing between human intelligence units throughout the world. In the future terrorist organizations, as decentralized units, will strive to find weaknesses within the intelligence community and intelligence gathering assets must remain flexible and communicative with other agencies in order to ensure a much safer international community. With the advancement and utilization of future technologies it will be equally important to utilize supporting elements such as satellite imagery, thermal imagery, and covert or clandestine foreign assets. These assets must not be used primarily, rather as a supplement to human intelligence operators throughout the world in order to prevent attacks such as those previously on US embassies and in New York on September 11th, 2001. Cooperation between foreign entities will also be vital to the success of international intelligence gathering units.


[1] Jeffrey T. Richelson , The US Intelligence Community, 5th ed. (Colorado: Westview Press, 2008), 529.
[2] The 9/11 Commission Report: Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, (New York: Norton, 2004), 353.
[3] Sun Tzu, The Art of War, translated by Lionel Giles, edited by Dallas Gavin, (New York: Barnes and Noble, 2004), 59.
[4] Chris Dishman, "Looking to future, CIA should focus on human intelligence." Christian Science Monitor, August 06, 1997. International Security & Counter Terrorism Reference Center, EBSCOhost (accessed July 28, 2011)